Mallox Ransomware New Infection techniques

Mallox Ransomware Implements New Infection Strategy

Evasive BatLoader Executes Ransomware Payloads on the Fly

The ransomware known as “TargetCompany,” which first appeared in June 2021, gained significant attention due to its unique method of appending the name of the targeted company as a file extension to encrypted files. This ransomware variant was also observed appending a “.mallox” extension to encrypted files, leading to its previous identification as “Mallox”. Last year, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) also reported a significant rise in the Mallox ransomware samples.

We have encountered a new variation of the Mallox ransomware that now appends the file extension “.malox” to the encrypted files, whereas previously, it used the “.mallox” extension. This ransomware binary is deployed using BatLoader, which is similar to the one reported – spreading RATs and Stealers.

The figure below shows infection new infection chain of Mallox ransomware.

Figure 1 – Infection Chain

In contrast to the previous infection method, this one eliminates the need for a downloader to retrieve the ransomware payload from a remote server. Instead, the ransomware payload is contained within a batch script, which is then injected into “MSBuild.exe”, without saving it on the disk.

The figure below shows the process tree.

Figure 2 – Process Tree

To date, Mallox ransomware has publicly disclosed details of over 20 victims from over 15 countries, with India being the most targeted nation, followed by the United States.

The figure below shows the geographic distribution of victims.

Figure 3 – Geographic Distribution of Victims

The majority of victims affected by Mallox ransomware belong to the Manufacturing, Energy & Utilities sectors, IT & ITES, and Professional Services Industries.

The figure below shows the industry-wise distribution of Mallox ransomware victims.

Figure 4 – Industry Wise Distribution of Victims

Technical Analysis

The initial infection occurs once the user clicks on the attachment included in the spam email. The attachment can either be an executable file that downloads BatLoader from a remote server, or it may directly contain the BatLoader within the spam attachment.

The figure below shows the batch script (SHA256: 5158b0a023299c1922423a065b9825fd1769f1a87ffd2031375a0e893d523318)  responsible for ransomware infection.

Figure 5 – Batch Script

The batch script utilized in this case is obfuscated, employing various variables that are defined in a random sequence. These variables are subsequently combined through concatenation to execute commands.

The example displayed in the figure below illustrates one instance of such variable concatenation within the script.

Figure 6 – Variables Concatenation

It executes the following commands:

  • “if not DEFINED IS_MINIMIZED set IS_MINIMIZED=1 && start “” /C /min “C:\Users\User_Name\Desktop\ransomware.bat”  && exit”

This command checks if the environment variable IS_MINIMIZED is defined. If it is not defined, it sets IS_MINIMIZED to 1, starts the same batch script in a minimized window, and then exits the previous instance of the current script.

  • copy /y “C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe” “C:\Users\User_Name \Desktop\ransomware.bat.exe”

This command will copy the PowerShell executable (powershell.exe) to a file named “batch script name” + “.exe” within the directory where the batch script is being executed.

  • attrib +s +h

This command sets the system and hidden attribute to the newly copied PowerShell file.

The figure below shows the “PowerShell.exe” copied as “ransomware.bat.exe”.

Figure 7 – Copying PowerShell.exe

  • “C:\Users\User_Name\Desktop\ransomware.bat.exe” -wIn 1 -enC <base64_encoded content>

The mentioned command is utilized to execute Base64 encoded content provided as a parameter. This encoded content is a PowerShell script responsible for extracting the ransomware payload from the BatLoader. The script achieves this extraction by scanning the initial BatLoader and identifying lines with the substring “ck”. When a line with “ck” is found, the script appends the substring following “ck” to an object using the Append method.

Figure 8 – PowerShell Script

This PowerShell script also drops a batch script named “killerrr.bat” in the %TEMP% directory, which can perform the following operations:

  • Kill over 600 processes using the taskkill /IM command.
  • Stops over 200 services using the net stop command.
  • Disables over 13 services using the sc config Service_Name start= disabled command.
  • Deletes over 200 services using the sc delete command.
  • Removes 2 directories “C:\Program Files (x86)\Kingdee\K3ERP\K3Express\KDHRAPP\client\log” and “C:\Program Files\Kingdee\K3ERP\K3Express\Logs”


The PowerShell script involves dynamically loading Malllox assembly. It achieves this injection method  using the following steps:

  • Uses System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load() to load the assembly from a byte array.
  • It retrieves the entry point of the loaded assembly using the EntryPoint property.
  • An instance of the loaded assembly is created using the CreateInstance method, providing the name of the entry point method.
Figure 9 – Loading Assembly from Byte Array

The ransomware binary is injected into the MSBuild.exe, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 10 – MSBuild.exe


Unlike other Mallox ransomware variants, this ransomware binary appends the encrypted files with the “.malox” extension.

The figure below shows the encrypted files.

Figure 11 – Encrypted Files

The figure below shows the ransom note.

Figure 12 – Ransom Note


The Mallox ransomware group has incorporated BatLoader into their operations, utilizing it to extract and inject the ransomware payload. This loader bears similarities to the one previously identified in the distribution of various malware families, such as Quasar RAT, Async RAT, Redline Stealer, and DC RAT.

The adoption of new infection techniques suggests that the TAs responsible for Mallox ransomware are actively modifying their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), underscoring their efforts to enhance evasiveness and maintain their malicious activities.

Our Recommendations 

We have listed some essential cybersecurity best practices that create the first line of control against attackers. We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below: 

Safety Measures Needed to Prevent Ransomware Attacks 

  • Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network. 
  • Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic. 
  • Use a reputed anti-virus and Internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile. 
  • Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity. 

Users Should Take the Following Steps After the Ransomware Attack 

  • Detach infected devices on the same network. 
  • Disconnect external storage devices if connected. 
  • Inspect system logs for suspicious events. 

Impact And Cruciality of Ransomware 

  • Loss of valuable data. 
  • Loss of the organization’s reputation and integrity. 
  • Loss of the organization’s sensitive business information. 
  • Disruption in organization operation. 
  • Monetary loss. 

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques 

Tactic Technique ID Technique Name 
Execution T1204   User Execution 
Defense Evasion T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Impair Defences
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hidden Files and Directories
File Deletion
Discovery T1082 
System Information Discovery 
File and Directory Discovery 
Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact 
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol 

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IndicatorsIndicator TypeDescription
hxxps[:]// hxxp[:]// URL
hxxp:// URL

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